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Introduction 
Governance is what states do, and since states play a vital role in the development 
process, almost all economists can agree that governance must be important for 
development. The growing recognition within mainstream economics that governance 
is important is simply a belated recognition within economic orthodoxy that the state 
plays a critical role even in a market-oriented society. The controversy and debate is 
about what the feasible governance capabilities are for a poor developing country 
attempting to develop in a global market with an essentially market-oriented 
economy. The answer to this is not as obvious as it may seem. The answer provided 
by the good governance approach is based on a theoretical understanding of a market 
economy that is contested by many economists supporting the construction of a 
market-oriented economy. But most significantly, the good governance approach 
ignores the feasibility of achieving these governance capabilities in poor countries, 
and therefore overlooks alternative methods of overcoming the obstacles and 
constraints that are preventing many developing countries from fully participating in 
and benefiting from the global economy.  
 
Markets are simply mechanisms for private contracting. The good governance reform 
agenda is based on the presumption that efficient markets are achievable in 
developing countries, and are sufficient for achieving sustained growth and 
development. These presumptions are derived from a specific reading of institutional 
economics that is plausible in theoretical terms even though many of the theoretical 
links that it asserts can be strongly challenged in terms of alternative readings of 
orthodox economic theory. The specific claim of good governance theory is while 
market failures in developing countries can be serious; the best way to address these 
market failures is by improving the efficiency of the market through good governance 
reforms. The experience of intervention to correct market failures in most developing 
countries after they became independent from colonial powers left a lot to be desired. 
Even though most of these countries did better after independence than they had 
under colonial rule, many eventually began to run into fiscal and banking sector 
problems by the 1970s. These problems were often the result of inadequate 
governance capabilities to manage their interventions properly, resulting for instance 
in attempts to accelerate industrialization with subsidies for infant industries without 
adequate performance standards being enforced.  
 
A perception developed within mainstream economics through the 1980s that while 
market failures could potentially be important, the cost of government failures when 
states attempted to correct market failures in these ways was likely to be even greater 
than the cost of the initial market failure[1-2]. The policy consensus of the 1980s was 
that the role of government should be reduced, but it eventually became clear that 
even this was inadequate because market failures remained significant. The good 
governance reform agenda subsequently emerged to address this problem from a 
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different angle. Instead of trying to improve on previous attempts at correcting market 
failures by strengthening requisite governance capabilities, the good governance 
agenda argued that governments should instead focus on governance capabilities to 
make markets work efficiently. Market failure would then be indirectly reduced and 
so would the need for specific interventions to address these market failures.  
 
The argument that was now developed was that market failure happens primarily 
because developing countries do not have well-defined property rights, a rule of law 
to adjudicate conflicts and a state that is restrained from expropriation and rent 
creation. All of these features of developing country markets raise the ‘transaction 
costs’ of trying to agree on and enforce contracts in markets, and this is the ultimate 
source of the market failure that developing countries suffer from. So if governance 
reforms could reduce these transaction costs by, for instance, improving the definition 
of property rights and the rule of law, and reducing corruption and expropriation in 
the economy, market failures would be significantly reduced and private contracting 
would then be able to allocate resources efficiently and drive growth and poverty 
reduction in these countries.  
 
This is why the good governance reform agenda can be described as an agenda for 
market-enhancing governance[3-4]. It is certainly theoretically plausible. The 
question is whether it is a practical route to governance reform in developing 
countries. Can these reforms be implemented to an extent that will significantly 
increase market efficiency, and will this improvement in market efficiency be 
sufficient to drive economic growth and broad-based development? One way to 
answer these questions is to look for any historical evidence of countries that followed 
good governance reforms and as a result achieved sustained growth and development. 
Despite the strong correlation between high per capita incomes and market enhancing 
governance, the evidence is much shakier when we begin to look for countries that 
first did good governance reforms and then achieved growth and development. The 
absence of any significant evidence of such a trajectory raises doubts about the 
practical plausibility of the underlying theory even if it makes sense a priori.  
 
In fact, the weakness of the available evidence leads us to suggest that the theory 
underpinning good governance theory is not actually plausible because these reforms 
to achieve market-enhancing governance capabilities in poor countries are difficult to 
implement in the absence of a significant social surplus and therefore the prior 
existence of a sufficiently productive economy, for reasons that we will briefly 
explain later. In contrast, the empirical evidence, such as it is, strongly suggests that in 
reality developing countries did not follow such a route on their way to prosperity. 
Instead, they had a variety of other governance capabilities that allowed them to 
sustain growth by addressing specific market failures, and we describe these 
capacities as growth-enhancing governance capabilities. The contemporary reform 
agenda is in real danger of setting vulnerable developing countries unachievable tasks 
and inadvertently furthering the frustration and despair that often already exists. In 
many Islamic countries there is already frustration with reform agendas that have 
created social disruption and pain without leading to any observable improvements in 
developmental prospects. This has led to disillusionment with many governments, and 
this can only deepen if unrealistic strategies continue to be followed without any 
critical interrogation of their empirical and theoretical roots.  
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Market-Enhancing versus Growth-Enhancing Governance  
The contemporary consensus about the governance required for development is based 
on the assumption that efficient markets are achievable to a sufficient extent in poor 
countries to sustain development without requiring any significant effort to correct 
market failures. However, achieving efficient markets does require some governance 
capabilities, and this governance agenda can be described as an agenda of developing 
market-enhancing governance conditions[5-6]. The common feature of these 
governance reforms is to make markets more efficient by reducing market transaction 
costs. In theory, all market failures are ultimately due to transaction costs that prevent 
potentially beneficial private contracts being executed. And therefore, again in theory, 
if transaction costs across the board could really be significantly reduced, specific 
interventions to correct market failures would become unnecessary. 
 
These arguments build on a number of selectively chosen links established by New 
Institutional Economics and the New Political Economy. The major links are 
summarized in Figure 1. It is important to note that these are by no means uncontested 
links even in terms of mainstream institutional theories. Link 1 is the claim that 
economic stagnation is ultimately due to high transaction cost markets, or in other 
words, market failures[5]. This link describes a tautology, because all missed 
opportunities for development can be defined as market failures. However, the 
tautology directs our attention to a debate between two very different approaches to 
dealing with market failures. The first and more conventional approach is to identify 
market failures that are particularly important in specific contexts and to address these 
with appropriate solutions as well as where necessary, the development of specific 
governance capabilities for their implementation. The second approach which has 
implicitly been adopted by the good governance approach is to argue that piecemeal 
corrections of market failures are unnecessary if generic improvements in market 
efficiency through good governance reforms can be achieved.  
 
Link 2 shows the innovation of the new good governance agenda, which argues that 
instead of addressing these market failures individually, governments should try and 
make markets across the board more efficient by addressing the underlying causes of 
market failure, such as weak property rights, the weak rule of law and arbitrary 
interventions[5-8]. The tautological part of the theory is that markets are essentially 
systems of contracts. If the absence of clear expectations and rights prevent 
contracting, market failure will follow by definition. But why do high transaction cost 
markets characterize every developing country? The specific response of good 
governance theory is not necessarily the only way of thinking about the causes and 
solutions to market failures. Instead of looking at the full range of possible 
explanations, in particular the cost of establishing efficient markets even to the extent 
that they are efficient in advanced countries, Link 3 asserts that unstable property 
rights, a poor rule of law and expropriation attempts by states are primarily the result 
of small groups engaging in rent seeking and corruption[2, 9-13].  
 
Finally, the good governance approach has to explain why corruption and rent seeking 
appear to be widespread in every developing country, particularly given the 
significant negative effects attributed to them. Once again, the good governance 
approach identifies a selective set of reasons, not the full range that contemporary 
theory has identified. In particular, as Link 4 shows, the approach asserts that small 
corrupt groups can profit from rent seeking and corruption at the expense of the 
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majority because government accountability is weak or non-existent[5, 14-15]. In 
fact, rent seeking is widespread in all societies, including advanced ones. As Stiglitz 
and others have pointed out, rents are an essential part of the normal operation of 
market economies, as well as being the subject of redistributive politics without which 
societies would not survive politically[16-17]. It follows therefore that rent seeking is 
an essential element in all societies.  
 
The good governance approach does not ask a number of important questions, in 
particular why some rent seeking creates rents that are particularly damaging, while 
other countries appear to have rent seeking that sustains growth-enhancing rents. It 
also does not ask why poor countries appear to have significantly greater illegal rent 
seeking which is an important component of corruption, while rich countries appear to 
be able to legalize and regulate a greater part of rent seeking[18-20]. Link 5 completes 
the cycle for the good governance approach because economic stagnation in turn 
prevents the poor from mobilizing and enables autocracy to continue.  
 
On the basis of these theoretical links the good governance agenda argues that it is 
necessary to complement liberalization and other market reforms with a simultaneous 
set of governance reforms that include improvements in the rule of law, defining and 
protecting property rights better, fighting corruption and rent seeking and embedding 
democracy and decentralization. As we have already argued, the power of the good 
governance agenda has been that many of these reforms are perceived as desirable by 
many civil society groups in developing countries as goals that are desirable in 
themselves. The issue of concern of for us is not whether these goals should be 
abandoned, but rather whether they are achievable in developing countries to an 
extent that they can form the basis of a poverty reduction and development agenda.  
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Figure 1 Theoretical Links in the Good Governance Agenda 
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The problem for the good governance agenda is that these are not the only theoretical 
links that can explain the persistence of patron-client politics, autocracy, corruption, 
weak rule of law and contested property rights in developing countries. We will not 
review the alternative theoretical arguments explaining these phenomena in poor 
countries as this has already been done elsewhere[16, 19-22]. The pertinent issue for 
us now is that even if the theoretical links asserted in the good governance argument 
are partially relevant, there is little evidence that good governance sets achievable 
governance goals for poor countries. Indeed, no poor country appears to achieve high 
scores in these governance capabilities regardless of their economic performance and 
development strategies. 
 
It is important to reiterate that the importance of markets in fostering and enabling 
economic development is not in question. Economic development is likely to be more 
rapid if markets mediating resource allocation (in any country) become more efficient. 
The development debate is rather about the extent to which markets can be made 
efficient in developing countries, and whether maximizing the efficiency of markets 
(to the degree that is achievable) is sufficient to maximize the pace of development. 
The alternative approach to governance argues not that markets should be supplanted, 
but rather that they will remain inherently inefficient in developing countries in the 
foreseeable future due to certain limitations in the structural characteristics of the 
economy that will always remain until a substantial degree of development is 
achieved.  
 
Given the possibility that there are structural factors preventing markets achieving 
significant efficiency, it follows that successful development requires critical 
governance capacities to address specific market failures. This is a very different 
reform agenda compared to the good governance one which presumes that effective 
across-the-board market efficiency can be achieved through this route. In fact, the 
historical evidence strongly suggests that successful developing countries did not 
achieve across-the-board market efficiency through good governance reforms, but 
rather had governance capabilities to correct market failures that were specific to their 
development strategies and social requirements.  
 
In particular, the evidence of successful East Asian developers of the last five decades 
and of China over the last three decades shows that the governance capacities that 
mattered were very different from the good governance capabilities. In terms of the 
market-enhancing conditions prioritized by the good governance approach, East Asian 
states and China often performed rather poorly. Democratic accountability was 
typically low, corruption was high and property rights were typically not well 
defined[21]. Instead, these states had effective institutions that could accelerate 
growth in conditions of technological backwardness and high transaction costs. To 
distinguish these governance capabilities from the good governance ones, we define 
these developmental governance capabilities as growth-enhancing governance.  
 
Growth is clearly not sufficient for broad based development, but sustaining growth is 
a necessary part of achieving sustainable development. Without growth broad-based 
development is arithmetically impossible unless the country is already very rich in per 
capita terms and the only thing required is redistribution. On the other hand, if broad-
based development cannot be achieved in line with growth, a growth strategy can 
become politically unsustainable. The capacity to correct critical market failures 
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constraining development therefore to a large extent requires governance capabilities 
to sustain growth, and these capacities are a necessary component of developmental 
capabilities. The broader political and redistributive institutions that sustain growth 
and ensure that it is broad-based can differ from country to country, but no country 
has achieved broad-based development without sustaining relatively high growth for 
long periods of time[23].  
 
Box 1 Market-Enhancing versus Growth-Enhancing Governance Capabilities  
The dominant ‘good governance’ reforms aim to promote governance capabilities 
that are market-enhancing: they aim to make markets more efficient by reducing 
transaction costs. To the extent that these reforms can be implemented they are likely 
to improve market outcomes in developing countries. Transaction costs are the costs 
of using markets to allocate resources. A fundamental requirement of efficient (low 
transaction cost) markets is that property rights should be well-defined and well-
protected, and for there to be a good rule of law so that contracts can be easily and 
cheaply enforced. 
 
The key market-enhancing governance goals are to set up institutions that: 
● Protect and Maintain Stable Property Rights 
● Enforce a Rule of Law and Effective Contract Enforcement 
● Minimize Rent Seeking and Corruption  
● Achieve a Transparent and Accountable Provision of Public Goods in line with 
Democratically Expressed Preferences  
 
However, there are structural and financial constraints that can prevent significant 
progress in developing these capabilities in poor countries. Given these constraints, 
growth can require targeted strategies whose implementation requires specific 
capabilities that we describe as growth-enhancing governance capabilities.  
 
Growth-enhancing governance capabilities are capabilities that allow developing 
countries to cope with the property right instability of early development, manage 
technological catching up, and maintain political stability in a context of endemic and 
structural reliance on patron-client politics.  
 
Key growth-enhancing governance goals are to achieve institutional-governance 
capabilities to:  
● Organize and enable transfers of land and resources to productive sectors in a 
context where land and asset markets are generally inefficient  
● Address labour market failures that result in inadequate training and investment in 
human capital  
● Address failures in capital markets that result in inadequate savings and investment, 
and inadequate investment in learning and adopting new technologies  
● Maintain political stability and acceptable redistributive justice in a context of rapid 
social transformation  
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Box 1 summarizes the main characteristics of governance emphasized in these two 
contrasting approaches. Market-enhancing governance is about setting up effective 
institutions that can enforce property rights across the board, enforce a rule of law, 
limit corruption and rent seeking and achieve political accountability. This is 
essentially the ‘good governance’ agenda. In theory, these capabilities would allow 
the developing country to achieve more rapid growth and development, but we will 
see that this expectation is unlikely to be borne out because the implementation of 
these governance goals is virtually impossible to any significant extent in poor 
countries. If progress on immediately achieving market-enhancing governance is 
likely to be very limited, growth and development may depend on the achievement of 
a much more targeted set of governance capabilities that enable the overcoming of 
specific market failures and constraints that stand in the way of growth. Therefore, 
what we describe as a growth-enhancing governance agenda would try to identify and 
set up institutional capabilities that are effective in addressing critical market failures 
that are relevant for a particular developing country at a particular stage of its 
development. The range of capabilities here are clearly much broader, and the 
relevant market failures that need to be addressed and which can feasibly be 
addressed may be different in different countries.  
 
Depending on the initial conditions, it may only be possible to develop effective 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities to a much more limited extent in some 
countries compared to others. But it is also most unlikely that poor countries will be 
able to enforce property rights and a rule of law effectively enough to achieve low 
transaction costs and efficient markets (which the market-enhancing governance 
agenda wants to achieve). In such a context, it is important to have at least some 
growth-enhancing institutions with the relevant governance capabilities on the part of 
the state to make these institutions effective. For instance, institutions may be required 
to assist investors to acquire land and other resources in a context of otherwise high 
transaction costs. Similarly, it may be vital to address failures in labour markets that 
prevent labour upskilling, backed by appropriate governance capabilities to ensure 
that the country achieves and maintains global competitiveness in at least some 
sectors. The same applies to institutions that address some of the critical capital 
market failures in developing countries, given that across the board improvements in 
capital market efficiency can take decades to achieve. If focused financing institutions 
can provide financing and risk sharing for critical sectors in a context of generally 
high transaction costs, and provided (growth-enhancing) governance capabilities can 
be developed to effectively operate these financing institutions, the effects for 
sustaining growth and development can be significant.  
 
This is why identifying necessary growth-enhancing governance capabilities and 
selecting the ones that can be feasibly and effectively developed in a particular 
country may be critical for sustaining growth and development. The growth-
enhancing institutions that will be most appropriate, and the optimal scale on which 
they can operate will be different in different countries because of differences in their 
initial conditions. But clearly, the total absence of such institutions will result in lost 
growth opportunities in a context where markets are structurally inefficient.  
 
The two sets of governance capabilities are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but the 
distinction between them is important, particularly if an exclusive focus on achieving 
market-enhancing governance capabilities diminishes the capacity of states to develop 
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growth-enhancing governance capabilities. In particular, if structural economic and 
political factors prevent the achievement of market-enhancing governance capabilities 
to a significant extent, a focus on trying to achieve these will be particularly 
frustrating for poor countries because the effort will not pay off in terms of higher or 
more sustainable growth and is likely eventually to be abandoned with significant 
economic and political consequences. 
 
Market failures in land, labour and capital markets that constrain growth in 
developing countries are, of course, widely acknowledged in economic theory. In the 
period up to the 1980s the consensus within economics was that states in developing 
countries needed to intervene to correct these market failures to promote 
development. Indeed, the interventionist policies of many developing countries in 
industrial policy, trade policy and so on were often justified in terms of addressing 
these market failures. However, it was not recognized at the time that the correction of 
market failures required strong governance capabilities for managing these 
interventions. These are precisely the capabilities that we have described as growth-
enhancing governance capabilities. The absence of effective growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities in many countries trying to overcome market failures in this 
period led to significant government failures. The short-term benefits of subsidies and 
interventions were captured by powerful interests who then failed to deliver 
productivity growth or new investments. Dissatisfaction with the results of 
intervention led to the counterrevolution within economics in the 1980s and the 
abandonment of intervention to correct market failures in many developing 
countries[24]. 
 
However, the wholesale abandonment of attempts to correct market failures is 
increasingly recognized as an over-reaction and a mistake[25]. A more appropriate 
response would have been to focus on a less ambitious set of corrections for market 
failures and the development of appropriate governance capabilities for managing 
these corrections. Instead, the consensus in the 1980s and 1990s abandoned piecemeal 
corrections to market failures and shifted to a much more ambitious strategy of fixing 
market failures across the board through market-enhancing (good governance) 
reforms. Initially, the policy shift was in the direction of the structural adjustment 
strategies of the 1980s where the aim was primarily to reduce the scope of the state, 
but by the 1990s the consensus had shifted to the good governance agenda 
summarized in Figure 1.  
 
Unfortunately, the case study evidence shows that developmental success in poor and 
emerging countries has always been based on very specific governance capabilities to 
address critical market failures. A significant part of the asset and resource re-
allocations necessary for accelerating development in developing countries have taken 
place through non-market processes or market processes assisted by administrative 
and political measures precisely because markets remain essentially inefficient at 
early stages of development regardless of attempts to make them otherwise. Examples 
of non-market asset transfers that were significant in underpinning growth processes 
include the creation and support of technology acquisition by the chaebol in South 
Korea in the 1960s using public resources and the creation of the Chinese TVEs using 
public resources in the 1980s and their privatization in the 1990s. Successful 
developers have displayed a range of institutional and political capacities that enabled 
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semi-market and non-market asset and property right re-allocations that were growth 
enhancing, thereby indirectly addressing failures in land and capital markets. In 
contrast, in less successful developers, the absence of necessary governance 
capabilities meant that non-market transfers descended more frequently into predatory 
expropriation that impeded development. In these countries, government failures 
prevented the resolution of critical market failures. 
 
Labour market failures that prevent adequate investment in training and skills 
acquisition are also well known, and these are also unlikely to be adequately 
addressed through improvements in good governance. In fact, successful developing 
countries did not wait to solve their skills and training problems while attempting to 
achieve good governance. Yet they were able to finance public investments in skill 
acquisition significantly. But even more importantly, they had the governance 
capabilities to ensure that these investments would not be wasted through the 
provision of training of indifferent quality that would fail to raise productivity and 
global competitiveness. The lesson for developing countries that are trying to improve 
their developmental performance should have been to learn the governance 
capabilities in more successful countries that ensured the success of specific strategies 
to deal with critical labour market failures. 
 
We also know that the most successful developers also had strategies for addressing 
market failures in capital markets that keep savings rates low and prevent investment 
in many sectors because of inadequate arrangements for risk sharing. Institutional 
failures, poor contracting and weak state enforcement capacities combine to keep 
savings rates very low in most developing countries. Even more seriously, the absence 
of effective institutions to share risk can constrain technology adoption and learning 
in poor countries[16]. Attempting to construct efficient capital markets through good 
governance to address these problems is at best a very partial solution because 
improvements are unlikely to be sufficient or have a significant impact in the short to 
medium term through this route. This is why the historical evidence shows that 
countries that were good at catching up had governance capabilities to address these 
market failures directly to raise savings and investments rates, and to incubate and 
support learning industries with effective monitoring and exit strategies[16].  
 
There is no question that interventions to correct market failures in many developing 
countries achieved disappointing results in the past. But if the alternative agenda of 
achieving significant market efficiency through good governance reforms is an 
unachievable chimera, then the only realistic option for developing countries is to 
revisit their own experiences and ask what went wrong. In general, poorly performing 
developing countries in the 1960s had poor growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities. Compared to their actual capabilities they adopted massively ambitious 
strategies of intervention that could not be properly managed or enforced. As the 
capacity to enforce particular strategies depends on specific political conditions, 
growth-enhancing strategies that worked in one country are not necessarily 
enforceable in another. This is also why when we look at strategies for correcting 
market failures and the governance capabilities that allowed this we find significant 
differences even between successful countries.  
 
The diversity of the experience of successful catching up in Asia tells us that it is 
important that strategies for correcting market failure have to be backed by effective 
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governance capabilities that enable the particular mechanisms through which market 
failures are being addressed to be effectively implemented. Where political conditions 
and initial institutional capabilities are strong, governance capabilities for effectively 
managing significant corrections of market failure are feasible. But in countries where 
the initial institutional and political conditions are not appropriate for extensive 
growth-enhancing interventions, the feasible range of interventions will have to be 
narrower. Moreover, success even in a narrow range of interventions may require 
developing specific growth-enhancing governance capabilities[3-4].  
 
At the very least, we can assert that the successful East Asian countries did not 
demonstrate the achievement of good governance defined as market-enhancing 
governance before their growth takeoffs. Moreover, in no case was there even a 
commitment to good governance as it is currently defined as a precondition for 
achieving sustainable development. In the next section we will examine some of the 
evidence, including the cross section data used by the World Bank and many 
mainstream economists to argue that good governance reforms are associated with 
more rapid and sustained development in contemporary developing countries.  
 
The Empirical Evidence  
The market-enhancing view of governance aims to explain the observation of poor 
performance in many developing countries. Superficially, many poorly performing 
countries appear to conform to the analysis of the good governance model because 
they have high levels of corruption, low accountability of political leaders, poor rule 
of law and plenty of evidence of predatory behaviour. But the superficial evidence can 
be misleading. All developing countries have poor governance scores as measured by 
the good governance or market-enhancing characteristics. So if we plot country scores 
for good governance (these measures are discussed later) against their per capita 
incomes, we get an almost perfect fit. However, the test that is required is to see if 
poor countries that scored higher in terms of market-enhancing governance 
characteristics actually did better in terms of convergence or catching up with 
advanced countries. When we conduct such a test we find that the evidence 
supporting the market-enhancing view of governance is very weak indeed. While 
poorly performing developing countries fail to meet good governance conditions, so 
do high-growth developing countries. This observation suggests that it is difficult for 
any developing country, regardless of its growth performance, to achieve the 
governance conditions required for efficient markets. This does not mean that market-
enhancing conditions are irrelevant, but it does mean that we need to qualify some of 
the arguments made for prioritizing market-enhancing governance reforms in 
developing countries if the evidence is that these are not possible to achieve. 
 
Evidence: Market-Enhancing Governance and Economic Growth.  
An extensive academic literature has tested the relationship between what we have 
described as market-enhancing governance conditions and economic performance. 
This literature typically reports a positive relationship between the two, appearing to 
support the hypothesis that an improvement in market-enhancing governance 
conditions will promote growth and accelerate convergence with advanced countries. 
This literature uses a number of indices of market-enhancing governance. In 
particular, it uses data provided by Stephen Knack and the IRIS centre at Maryland 
University, as well as more recent data provided by Kaufmann’s team and available 
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on the World Bank’s website. If market-enhancing governance were relevant for 
explaining economic growth, we would expect the quality of market-enhancing 
governance at the beginning of a period (of say ten years) to have an effect on the 
economic growth achieved during that period.  
 
However, the Knack-IRIS data set is only available for most countries from 1984 and 
the Kaufmann-World Bank data set only from 1996 onwards. We have to make sure 
that we test the importance of market-enhancing governance by using the score of a 
country at the beginning of a period of economic performance to see if initial 
differences in market-enhancing governance scores can explain the subsequent 
differences in performance between countries. This is important, as a correlation 
between governance indicators at the end of a period and economic performance 
during that period could be picking up the reverse direction of causality, where rising 
per capita incomes result in an improvement in market-enhancing governance 
conditions. There are good theoretical reasons to expect market-enhancing 
governance to improve as per capita incomes increase (as more resources become 
available in the budget for securing property rights, sustaining democratic systems, 
fighting corruption and so on). This reverses the direction of causality between 
growth and governance. Thus, for the Knack-IRIS data, the earliest decade of growth 
that we can examine would be 1980–90, and even here we have to remember that the 
governance data that we have is for a year almost halfway through the growth period. 
The World Bank data on governance begins in 1996, and therefore these can at best 
be used for examining growth during 1990–2003, keeping in mind once again that 
these indices are for a year halfway through the period of growth being considered.  
 
Stephen Knack’s IRIS team at the University of Maryland compile their indices using 
country risk assessments based on the responses of relevant constituencies and expert 
opinion[26]. These provide measures of market-enhancing governance quality for a 
wide set of countries from the early 1980s onwards. This data provides indices for a 
number of key variables that measure the performance of states in providing market-
enhancing governance. The five relevant indices in this data set are for ‘corruption in 
government’, ‘rule of law’, ‘bureaucratic quality’, ‘repudiation of government 
contracts’, and ‘expropriation risk’. These indices provide a measure of the degree to 
which governance is capable of reducing the relevant transaction costs that are 
considered necessary for efficient markets. The IRIS data can be used to aggregate 
these indices into a single ‘property rights index’ that ranges from 0 (the poorest 
conditions for market efficiency) to 50 (the best conditions). This index measures a 
range of market-enhancing governance conditions and is very useful (within the 
standard limitations of all subjective data sets) for testing the significance of market-
enhancing governance conditions for economic development. Annual data for the 
index are available from 1984 for most countries.  
 
A second data set that has become very important for testing the role of market-
enhancing governance comes from Kaufmann’s team[27] and is available on the 
World Bank’s website[28]. This data aggregates a large number of indices available 
in other data sources into six broad governance indicators. These are: 
1. Voice and Accountability – measuring political, civil and human rights 
2. Political Instability and Violence – measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, or 
changes in, government, including terrorism 
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3. Government Effectiveness – measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the 
quality of public service delivery 
4. Regulatory Burden – measuring the incidence of ‘market-unfriendly’ policies 
5. Rule of Law – measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
6. Control of Corruption – measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption and state capture. 
 
We have divided the countries for which data are available into three groups. 
“Advanced countries” are high-income countries using the World Bank’s 
classification with the exception of two small oil economies (Kuwait and the UAE), 
which we classify as developing countries. This is because although they have high 
levels of per capita income from oil sales, they have achieved lower levels of 
industrial and agricultural development than other high-income countries. We also 
divide the group of developing countries into a group of “diverging developing 
countries” whose per capita GDP growth is lower than the median growth rate of the 
advanced country group, and a group of “converging developing countries” whose per 
capita GDP growth rate is higher than the median advanced country rate.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the data for the 1980s from the Knack-IRIS dataset. For the 
decade of the 1980s, the earliest property right index available in this dataset for most 
countries is for 1984.  
Table 2 shows the composite data for the 1990s using an aggregation of the indices 
available in the Kaufmann-World Bank series. Table 3–Table 8 show the Kaufmann-
World Bank data for the 1990s for the six indices separately from the Kaufmann-
World Bank data set. Figure 2–Figure 9 show the same data in graphical form. The 
tables and plots demonstrate that the role of market-enhancing governance conditions 
in explaining differences in growth rates in developing countries is at best very weak.  
 
First, there is virtually no difference between the median property rights index 
between converging and diverging developing countries. Secondly, the range of 
variation of the governance index is almost exactly the same for converging and 
diverging countries. The absence of any clear separation between converging and 
diverging developing countries in terms of market-enhancing governance conditions 
should cast doubt on the robustness of the econometric results of a large number of 
studies that report that improvements in market-enhancing governance conditions 
have had a significant effect on economic growth[6, 8, 29-30].  
 
Third, for all the indices of governance we have available, the data suggest a very 
weak positive relationship between the quality of governance and economic growth. 
The direction of the relationship is as the market-enhancing governance view predicts 
but the weakness of the relationship demands a closer look at the underlying data. 
This demonstrates that the positive relationship depends to a great extent on a large 
number of advanced countries having high scores on market-enhancing governance 
(the countries shown as diamond-shaped points in Figure 2–Figure 9) and the bulk of 
developing countries which are diverging or low-growth countries which also have 
low scores on market-enhancing governance (shown as triangular points). However, if 
we only look at these countries, we are unable to say anything about the direction of 
causality as we have good theoretical reasons to expect market-enhancing governance 
to improve in countries with high per capita incomes. The critical countries for 
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establishing the direction of causality are the converging developing countries (shown 
as square points). These are countries like the East Asian countries and China (but 
also include some other countries that occasionally enjoy bursts of growth). By and 
large, converging countries do not have significantly better market-enhancing 
governance scores than diverging ones. In the 1980s data set, there are relatively very 
few converging countries, and so the relationship between market-enhancing 
governance and growth appears to be a positive one using the Knack-IRIS data set. 
However, in the 1990s data set, the number of converging countries is greater and the 
positive relationship becomes much weaker both visually and using measures of 
goodness of fit despite the bias created by the governance indicators only being 
available from 1996 for the Kaufmann-World Bank data set. The data therefore 
suggests that even the weak positive relationship between market-enhancing 
governance and growth could to some extent be based on a reverse causality, with 
richer countries having better scores in terms of market-enhancing governance.  
 
The policy implications of these observations are rather important. Given the large 
degree of overlap in the market-enhancing governance scores achieved by converging 
and diverging developing countries, we need to significantly qualify the claim made 
in much of the governance literature that an improvement in market-enhancing 
governance quality in poorly-performing countries is necessary and sufficient to 
achieve a significant improvement in growth performance. If anything, the data 
suggests that since differences in market-enhancing governance capabilities are not 
significant between converging and diverging countries, we need to examine other 
dimensions of governance capabilities that could explain differences in growth 
performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Market-Enhancing Governance: Property Rights and Growth 1980-90 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  21 52 12 
Median Property Rights 
Index 1984 45.1 22.5 27.8 
Observed range of Property 
Rights Index 25.1 – 49.6 9.4 – 39.2 16.4 – 37.0 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1980-90 2.2 -1.0 3.5 
The IRIS Property Rights Index can range from a low of 0 for the worst governance conditions to a 
high of 50 for the best conditions. 
Sources: IRIS-3[26], World Bank[31]. 
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Table 2 Market-Enhancing Governance: Property Rights and Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Property Rights 
Index 1996 47.0 25.0 23.7 
Observed range of Property 
Rights Index 32.3 – 50.0 10 – 38.3 9.5 – 40.0 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0 
The property right index here is an aggregate of the corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality indices 
on a 50 point scale together with the index of repudiation of government contracts and expropriation 
risk.  
Sources: World Bank[28], World Bank[31]. 
 
Table 3 Market-Enhancing Governance: Voice/Accountability and Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Voice and 
Accountability Index 1996 1.5 -0.4 -0.3 
Observed range of Voice and 
Accountability Index 0.4 – 1.8 -1.5 – 1.1 -1.7 – 1.4 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Sources: World Bank[28], World Bank[31]. 
 
Table 4 Market-Enhancing Governance: Political Instability and Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Political Instability 
and Violence Index 1996 1.2 -0.4 0.0 
Observed range of Instability 
and Violence Index -0.5 – 1.6 -2.8 – 1.1 -2.7 – 1.0 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Sources: World Bank[28], World Bank[31]. 
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Table 5 Market-Enhancing Governance: Govt Effectiveness and Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Government 
Effectiveness Index 1996 1.9 -0.5 -0.2 
Observed range of Govt 
Effectiveness Index 0.6 – 2.5 -2.1 – 0.8 -2.2 – 1.8 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Sources: World Bank[28], World Bank[31]. 
 
 
Table 6 Market-Enhancing Governance: Regulatory Quality and Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Regulatory Quality 
Index 1996 1.5 -0.1 0.2 
Observed range of 
Regulatory Quality Index 0.8 – 2.3 -2.4 – 1.2 -2.9 – 2.1 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Sources: World Bank[28], World Bank[31]. 
 
 
Table 7 Market-Enhancing Governance: Rule of Law and Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Rule of Law Index 
1996 1.9 -0.4 -0.3 
Observed range of Rule of 
Law Index 0.8 – 2.2 -1.8 – 1.1 -2.2 – 1.7 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Sources: World Bank[28], World Bank[31]. 
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Table 8 Market-Enhancing Governance: Corruption and Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Control of 
Corruption Index 1996 1.8 -0.4 -0.3 
Observed range of Control of 
Corruption Index 0.4 – 2.2 -2.0 – 0.8 -1.7 – 1.5 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 0.4 3.0 
The Kaufmann-World Bank index has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Sources: World Bank[28], World Bank[31]. 
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Figure 2 Market-Enhancing Governance and Growth 1980-90 
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Figure 3 Market-Enhancing Governance and Growth 1990-2003 
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Figure 4 Political Accountability and Growth 1990-2003 
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Figure 5 Political Instability and Growth 1990-2003 
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Figure 6 Government Effectiveness and Growth 1990-2003 
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Figure 7 Regulatory Quality and Growth 1990-2003 
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Figure 8 Rule of Law and Growth 1990-2003 
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Figure 9 Control of Corruption and Growth 1990-2003 
 
The many studies that find a significant positive relationship between market-
enhancing governance and growth usually do so by pooling advanced and developing 
countries together, or pooling together developing countries at different levels of 
development. Our examination of the data suggests that these studies can be 
misleading because we expect more advanced countries to have better market 
governance capabilities. Advanced countries are also expected to have lower growth 
rates in general because they are already close to the technology frontier. It is 
therefore difficult to separate these effects statistically given the complex 
relationships between per capita incomes, governance capabilities and growth rates in 
pooled data. When developing countries are looked at separately the relationship 
between market-enhancing governance indicators and growth rates is much weaker if 
it exists at all, and even in this case, we need to be aware of sample selection 
problems if we pool relatively advanced and poorer developing countries.  
 
The causality problem here has to be carefully defined. We do not have to reject the 
hypothesis that if market-enhancing governance could be improved perhaps growth 
would be higher. It is quite plausible that an improvement in market-enhancing 
governance capabilities would have a positive effect on growth. The problem rather is 
the observation that in fact market-enhancing governance appears not to be easy to 
improve in poor countries. In that case, market-enhancing governance is once again 
not causally responsible for growth even though in theory an improvement in these 
conditions may have helped.  
 
These observations suggest that to identify the critical governance capabilities for 
sustaining growth and development it is important to look at individual countries that 
have made a successful transition from underdevelopment to sustained development. 
This brings us to the Asian high-growth countries of the late twentieth century. Case 
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studies of the governance conditions of these countries demonstrate very strongly that 
none of them conformed to the expectations of good governance theory[32-33].  
 
Our argument is also supported by the analysis of growth in African countries by 
Sachs and his collaborators[34]. In their study of African countries these authors point 
out that economies with higher per capita incomes are expected to have better market-
enhancing governance quality. As a result, higher scores on governance indicators 
should not be used to explain higher incomes. To correct for this bias, they argue that 
market-enhancing (good governance) indicators should not be directly used as 
explanatory variables. Instead they use the deviation of the country’s governance 
indicator (in this case the Kaufmann-World Bank index) from the predicted value of 
the indicator given that country’s per capita income at the beginning of the period. 
This approach is a sophisticated way of dealing with the two-way causation between 
governance and growth. If market-enhancing governance matters for growth, we 
would expect countries that had better governance than expected for their per capita 
incomes to do better in subsequent periods compared to countries that only achieved 
average or below average governance for their per capita incomes. The Sachs study 
finds that when adjusted in this way, market-enhancing governance has no effect on 
the growth performance of African countries. This result is entirely consistent with 
our observations. 
 
However, we do not entirely agree with the Sachs study when they conclude that 
these results show that governance reforms are not an immediate priority for African 
countries. They argue that to trigger growth in Africa what is required instead is a big 
push in the form of a massive injection of investment in infrastructure and disease 
control. While the case for a big push in Africa is strong, this does not mean that 
African countries have the minimum necessary governance conditions to ensure that a 
viable economic and social transformation will be unleashed by such an investment 
push. The evidence of big push experiments in many countries has demonstrated that 
growth is only sustainable if resources are used to enhance productive capacity and 
new producers are able to achieve productivity growth and competitiveness. These 
outcomes are not likely in the presence of significant market failures and therefore 
require support from state structures possessing the appropriate governance 
capabilities to overcome these market failures.  
 
The econometric results reported by Sachs et al.[34] do not actually show that all 
types of governance were irrelevant for growth, only that the market-enhancing 
governance measured by available governance indicators did not explain differences 
in performance between these developing countries. Other forms of governance may 
be very important, but indices measuring these governance capacities are not readily 
available. In our next section we look at the evidence suggesting the importance of 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities. 
 
On the other hand, our interpretation of the evidence appears to be contradicted by the 
influential paper by Acemoglu et al.[35] They argue that the achievement of stable 
property rights decades or even longer ago enabled some countries to become 
prosperous while others who failed to achieve these conditions stagnated. Their 
argument uses instrumental variables to measure the stability of property rights a 
century or more ago. Their now-famous indicator is the relative frequency of deaths 
of white settlers in different parts of Africa that determined whether or not Europeans 
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set up settler colonies with stable property rights. Where malaria deaths were low, 
white settlers went and settled and set up states which protected property rights. In 
contrast, white settlers stayed away from places where malaria deaths were high and 
instead set up extractive colonies where property rights were destabilized by colonial 
powers. They then find a strong correlation between low malaria deaths a long time 
ago (proxying for stable property rights being set up) and current per capita incomes, 
suggesting that stable property rights were significant in explaining prosperity.  
 
This analysis is seductive in its use of innovative statistical techniques but suffers 
from serious historical problems. Most significantly, the underlying historical 
processes that the instrumental variables are capturing do not actually support the 
interpretation of the authors. The countries where settlers went and settled in did not 
enjoy stable property rights while the settlers were taking over these societies. Indeed, 
they suffered from precipitous collapses of traditional property rights as large tracts of 
land were expropriated by colonial settlers. In some cases the expropriation was so 
severe and rapid that indigenous populations collapsed entirely, sometimes in 
genocidal proportions. To describe the growth that happened as being due to the prior 
establishment of stable property rights does violence to the historical facts.  
 
It is more accurate to say that where the transformation of property rights to capitalist 
ones happened very rapidly through the use of exceptional amounts of violence, 
capitalist economies emerged earlier. In these countries, which are the ones where 
white settlers went to, the transition to productive economies allowed the 
establishment of good governance. The rapid emergence of viable capitalist 
economies subsequently allowed property rights to be protected and become stable in 
the way we would expect. In other developing countries the process of transformation 
is still going on. In one sense, we could even argue that property rights were more 
stable in the non-settler countries because a precipitous historical rupture did not 
occur there. The problem for these countries is that similar property right transitions 
have to be organized today in a context where markets remain inefficient and subject 
to high transaction costs.  
 
The reform challenge is to organize transitions in these countries with less violence 
and more justice than the processes through which the apparently good governance 
countries with white settler histories emerged. Of course once a viable capitalism 
becomes established, property rights are likely to become well protected because the 
new owners of rights will be willing to spend resources to protect their rights. In 
settler colonies this happened quite a long time ago, but the stability of property rights 
across the board in these societies did not predate the establishment of a productive 
capitalism. In other words, Acemoglu et al.’s argument suffers from exactly the type 
of causality problem as the other good governance arguments we discussed earlier, 
despite their use of more sophisticated econometrics and proxy variables.  
 
Our empirical interpretation is strongly supported by recent work being done at the 
French development agency, the AFD, by Nicolas Meisel and Jacques Aoudia[36], 
whose work replicates our findings using a new data set. They borrow our 
classification of developing countries into converging and diverging groups and find 
exactly the same pattern that we have described. The replication of our findings using 
an independent data set suggests that our argument is robust. 
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The task of further research is to distinguish between different types of developing 
countries within the converging and diverging groups. We know that these groups 
include countries of quite different prospects and of course levels of development. For 
instance, converging countries include some countries that are growing rapidly 
because of mineral resources, countries that are growing because they possess a 
comparative advantage in some low-technology manufacturing exports, and yet others 
that are on sustainable growth paths with strong technology acquisition strategies and 
productivity growth. Clearly, the last subset is the most interesting one and is the 
subset that others within the converging set should attempt to emulate if they are to 
sustain their growth rates. Similarly, within the diverging group there are various 
types of countries, including some middle-income countries that have run into serious 
problems of sustaining productivity growth as well as some very poor countries that 
have not yet achieved a takeoff. Further research into these different subsets will 
enhance our understanding of the governance challenges that different types of 
countries face in attempting to either trigger or sustain growth and development. In 
each case, the answer may be to develop specific governance capabilities to enhance 
growth that are quite different from the general good governance reforms suggested 
by the market-enhancing governance approach. 
 
Evidence: Growth-Enhancing Governance and Economic Growth 
The case for growth-enhancing governance argues that markets in developing 
countries are bound to be relatively inefficient because of high transaction costs. As a 
result developing countries are likely to face significant market failures in transferring 
assets and resources to growth sectors, in attracting the best and most appropriate 
technologies requiring prolonged periods of learning, and in providing the right mix 
of training and incentives for skills enhancement. In consequence, growth through the 
expansion of new productive capacity and systematically moving up the value chain is 
likely to be heavily constrained in most developing countries. Not surprisingly, 
successful developing countries demonstrate a variety of institutions and governance 
capabilities to address these major areas of market failure, together with institutional 
and political capacities to achieve sufficient inclusion to manage political stability 
during transitions that are bound to involve periods of conflict, strife and tension[32-
33].  
 
The case study evidence strongly supports our analysis. Asset and land market 
failures are significant in developing countries and prevent growth sectors getting 
access to all their resources purely through market processes. Historically, processes 
of non-market asset transfers have been very diverse, as have been the required 
governance capabilities to ensure their efficiency. Examples include the English 
Enclosures from the 16th to the 18th century, which transferred common lands in rural 
England to emerging capitalist sheep farmers through parliamentary acts and led to 
the agrarian revolution that was the basis of the subsequent industrial revolution in 
England. The creation of the chaebol in South Korea in the 1960s using transfers of 
public resources to the chaebol is another example of effective growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities on the part of the South Korean state to make valuable 
resources available to potentially productive new industrial activities and firms. The 
creation of the Chinese TVEs using public resources in the 1980s and their gradual 
transfer to private hands in the 1990s is another example of an effective growth-
enhancing strategy backed by appropriate governance capabilities.  
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As for failures in labour and capital markets that slow down technological upgrading 
and the upskilling of labour, the empirical evidence particularly from East Asia and 
China also strongly support the importance of growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities for implementing targeted corrections to these market failures. In 
successful countries, incentives for technology acquisition were created using many 
different mechanisms including tariff protection (in virtually every case but to varying 
extents), direct subsidies to large firms investing in new technologies (in particular in 
South Korea), subsidized and prioritized infrastructure for priority sectors (in China 
and Malaysia), subsidizing the licensing of advanced foreign technologies (in 
Taiwan), and managing the foreign exchange value of the currency (in many early 
developers and recently in China). The governance capabilities of countries to manage 
these incentives played a critical part in determining the relative success of countries 
in moving up the value chain. In successful countries incentives were changed over 
time in line with changing technological and market conditions. Firms and sectors that 
did not perform could not expect to receive incentives forever. In less successful 
performers, these governance capabilities did not exist and strategies of moving up 
the value chain failed in the end[21, 37].  
 
Thus, one area in which poor countries need to focus on is on national investment and 
technology policies as a means of achieving technological upgrading[38]. The success 
of these strategies will in turn depend on the development of governance capabilities 
in these countries to manage the identification and provision of incentives for 
investment in technological upgrading. These are difficult governance capabilities, 
but not necessarily more difficult than trying to achieve across the board rule of law 
reforms or anti-corruption reforms in poor countries, and they have at least the 
support of historical evidence from East Asia as achievable governance goals for poor 
countries. Clearly, most poor countries will not be immediately able to emulate China 
or South Korea in the scale of their ability to encourage new investments. But it is 
nevertheless very important for developing countries to understand these success 
stories and why successes in these countries were not necessarily achieved by 
following a good governance or market-enhancing strategy.  
 
Developing countries then need to develop their own institutional experiments 
appropriate to their political and institutional initial conditions to address the most 
significant market failures that are constraining growth in their core economic sectors. 
The main lesson they should learn from China and East Asia is that appropriate 
governance capabilities to implement these policies are critical. But clearly, most 
countries should begin with modest local experiments to upgrade existing sectors and 
technologies in countries that currently have weak governance capabilities, aiming to 
gradually build up growth-enhancing governance capabilities.  
 
The importance of these governance capabilities are also indicated by the histories of 
poorly performing countries because we know that when governments intervene to 
correct market failure without the governance capabilities to manage and enforce 
these strategies, the outcome can be disappointing. If the requisite governance 
capacities are missing, a growth-enhancing strategy may have high costs of 
government failure, as poorly implemented interventions may fail to improve resource 
allocation significantly while suffering from high rent-seeking costs.  
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Paradoxically, the very diversity of strategies for correcting market failures in 
successful countries can be cause for optimism because it means that a variety of 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities can play a role in a country’s development 
effort. While a full understanding of this diversity can only be achieved by studying a 
series of case studies, Table 9 summarizes these experiences for a selection of 
countries showing the type of growth-enhancing strategies that they followed and the 
associated governance capabilities that either supported or obstructed the 
implementation of these strategies. During the 1960s and into the 1980s, most 
developing countries followed variants of growth-enhancing strategies that had 
common elements even though they often differed significantly in their detail. In all 
countries, the two primary goals of developmental interventions were a) to accelerate 
resource allocation to growth sectors and b) to accelerate technology and skills 
acquisition in these sectors.  
 
To achieve the first, a variety of policy mechanisms were used including bureaucratic 
allocation of land (including land reform), the licensing of land use, influencing the 
allocation and use of foreign exchange and influencing the allocation of bank credit. 
In some cases, price controls and fiscal transfers were also used to accelerate the 
transfer of resources to particular sectors. To achieve the second, incentives for 
technology acquisition included targeted tax breaks or subsidies, protection of 
particular sectors for domestic producers engaged in setting up infant industries, 
licensing of foreign technologies and subcontracting these to domestic producers, 
setting up investment zones for high technology industries and subsidizing 
infrastructure for them, and subsidizing higher education and skills acquisition of 
different types. The critical observation from the perspective of governance strategies 
is that for both types of policies, success required the possession or development of 
very specific governance capabilities to effectively implement the strategies being 
followed. These included in particular, the capability to monitor resource use and 
withdraw resources or support from activities that proved to be making inadequate 
progress.  
 
The growth-enhancing governance challenge for countries is to first identify the most 
important market failures constraining growth in that country, to identify possible 
responses to these market failures and finally picking responses which can either be 
implemented given existing governance capabilities or which may become viable if 
critical governance capabilities can be developed. In most countries, sufficient 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities do not exist to implement very significant 
responses to critical market failures. At the same time, an attempt to suddenly achieve 
a high level of growth-enhancing governance capabilities is also likely to fail. A 
pragmatic appraisal of what is feasible should guide the development of a growth-
enhancing governance reform agenda for each country[38].  
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Table 9 Growth-Enhancing Governance in Selected Countries 1960-2000 
Latin America 
1950s to 1970s
Indian 
subcontinent 
1980s 1990s
Supportive or Obstructive 
Governance Capabilities
Critical Components of Growth-
Enhancing Strategy
Economic 
Outcomes
Moderate to weak governance 
capacities to discipline non-
performing rent recipients. Agencies 
often have contradictory goals 
defined by different constituencies.
Fragmented political factions help to 
protect the rents of the inefficient for 
a share of these rents.
State capacities decline as committed 
and intelligent individuals leave.
Targeted subsidies to accelerate 
catching up in critical sectors 
(using protection, licensing of 
foreign exchange, price controls 
and other mechanisms).
Public sector technology 
acquisition in subsidized public 
enterprises.
Resource transfers to growth 
sectors using licensing and pricing 
policy.
Public and private 
sector infant 
industries often fail 
to grow up.
Rent seeking costs 
are often the most 
visible effects of 
intervention.
Moderate to low 
growth and slow 
transformation
Indian 
subcontinent 
1960s 1970s
(With some 
variations these 
characteristics 
describe many 
developing 
countries of that 
period)
Malaysia 
1980s 1990s
Moderately effective centralized 
governance of interventions.
Assisted by centralized transfers to 
intermediate classes which reduced 
incentives of political factions to seek 
rents by protecting inefficient firms. 
Public sector technology 
acquisition strategies using public 
enterprises with subcontracting for 
domestic firms.
 Targeted infrastructure and 
incentives for MNCs with 
conditions on technology transfer. 
Rapid growth and 
capitalist 
transformation
Latin America 
1980s onwards
Focus on market-enhancing 
governance. 
Breakdown of corporatist alliances 
allows rapid liberalization to be 
implemented.
Rapid liberalization across the 
board.
Output growth in 
sectors that already 
have comparative 
advantage, in 
particular in 
commodities.
Non-market asset allocations 
(consolidations, mergers and 
restructuring of ).
Targeted conditional subsidies for 
 to accelerate catching-up.
chaebol
chaebol
Very rapid growth 
and capitalist 
transformation
South Korea
1960s to early 
1980s
Centralized and effective governance 
of interventions by agencies with 
long-term stake in development.
Effective power to implement 
assisted by weakness of political 
factions so that inefficient subsidy 
recipients are unable to buy 
protection from them.
Liberalization primarily in the form 
of a withdrawal of implicit targeted 
subsidies, in particular through the 
relaxation of licensing for capital 
goods imports.
Much more gradual withdrawal of 
protection across the board for 
domestic markets.
Moderate to weak governance 
capacities to implement remain but 
do less damage as the scope of 
growth enhancing policies decline.
Fragmented political factions 
continue to have an effect on market-
enhancing governance by restricting 
tax revenues and making it difficult 
to construct adequate infrastructure.
Growth led by 
investments in 
sectors that already 
have comparative 
advantage.
Higher growth but 
limited to a few 
sectors.
Domestic capacity building 
through selective tariffs and 
selective credit allocation.
Governance effective in directing 
resources to import-substituting 
industries but weak in disciplining 
poor performers. 
Weakness linked to “corporatist” 
alliances that constrained 
disciplining powerful sectors.
Initial rapid growth 
slows down. 
Many infant 
industries fail to 
grow up.
 
 
Conclusions  
The desirability of many of the objectives of the good governance agenda is not in 
question. Many social groups and constituencies in developing countries want to see a 
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deepening of democracy, greater accountability of their governments, a clampdown 
on corruption and the introduction of a rule of law and stable property rights. Many of 
these goals should indeed be long-term goals of development in their own right. The 
policy question for developing countries is rather about the extent to which these 
goals are immediately achievable and the extent to which they should be prioritized as 
targets given that reform capabilities are limited and the resources to effectively 
implement reforms even more so. Here, the theoretical arguments and historical 
evidence suggest that we should be very careful not to confuse means with ends, goals 
with preconditions, methods with outcomes. There is no credible evidence of any poor 
country that has first achieved significant improvements in its democratic 
accountability, reduced corruption to very low levels in a sustainable way, achieved a 
recognizably good rule of law and stable property rights and as a result achieved 
significantly high and sustainable growth and development. There are good reasons 
why such empirical examples cannot be found.  
 
All of the available evidence is that the achievement of conventional good governance 
has been through a simultaneous and parallel set of improvements in good governance 
in line with the achievement of economic prosperity. This is because significant 
resources and productive political constituencies are required to achieve the effective 
implementation of good governance goals, and these resources and constituencies are 
themselves the outcome of growth and development. There is no question that the 
achievement of these conditions can further improve confidence in contracts and 
markets, and thereby further improve market efficiency, allowing growing economies 
to enjoy virtuous cycles of improvements in governance and economic performance. 
However, the precondition for these virtuous cycles to emerge is that there is a 
sustainable prior strategy of promoting growth and development and states have 
capabilities to sustain these strategies.  
 
Unfortunately, largely for ideological reasons, the promotion of state capabilities to 
sustain growth through addressing critical market failures in poor countries has fallen 
out of the reform agenda, particularly in the international discourse promoted by rich 
countries, the international financial institutions and the donor community. Yet, the 
actual evidence of growth and development from the most successful developers of 
the twentieth century, and in particular from China today, suggests that these growth-
enhancing governance capabilities are the most important ones, if growth is to be 
sustained and that these are in turn the real preconditions for the interactive 
development of market-enhancing governance capabilities over time. 
 
Fortunately, there is a growing perception in the policy community that the focus on 
good governance has been a diversion from the most pressing tasks of governance 
capability improvements. Consequently there are some encouraging signs of a re-
adjustment of the reform agenda. These shifts need to be welcomed and a new agenda 
of reform has to be developed rapidly as frustration with conventional reform 
strategies grows in many poorly performing and fragile societies. Nevertheless, we 
should expect strong resistance from many existing reformers, economists and 
advisors whose reputations have been based on the old agenda, and who feel 
threatened by any radical shift in policy. However, the indications on the ground are 
that these reformers have failed to achieve sustainable improvements in terms of their 
own reforms, defined as sustainable reductions in corruption, improvements in the 
rule of law or in perceptible improvements in the accountability of their governments. 
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This is often despite the expenditure of vast amounts of grants and loans in the pursuit 
of the good governance agenda. Some of these economies are growing, but any 
examination of the drivers of growth in these countries shows that their economies are 
often growing due to niche sectors that are struggling to perform despite what the 
government is doing rather than benefiting from significant improvements in market 
efficiency as a result of reforms carried out under the good governance agenda.  
 
The danger of an exclusive focus on market-enhancing governance is that we may 
lose opportunities for carrying out critical reforms that are more likely to produce 
results. We may also create disillusionment with governance reforms leading to the 
emergence of a false perception that governance does not matter that much for 
economic development. The urgency of shifting the focus of reforms to growth-
enhancing governance is underlined by the fact that these reforms require a very 
different set of discussions with stakeholders to identify critical market failures. This 
in turn needs to be followed by the careful identification of the most appropriate ways 
of addressing these critical market failures in the specific context of that country and 
depending on the potential of developing appropriate governance capabilities.  
 
All of these processes will take time and involve a very different set of procedures 
than the ones that have raised awareness of good governance deficits. Given the stark 
situation in terms of policy space and limited reform capabilities, the only option for 
most developing countries is to embark on the growth-enhancing governance agenda 
on a relatively small scale. I have elsewhere described this as a ‘Hirschmanian’ 
approach to pursuing growth-enhancing governance reforms[38-39]. Developing 
countries can expect little help or assistance from western donors and financial 
institutions in this area given the dominant ideologies informing the understanding of 
these players. It is not surprising that the successful developers of East Asia did not 
develop any of their most important governance capabilities to address market failures 
as a result of advice or persuasion coming from advanced countries.  
 
It is important to reassert the importance of governance reforms at a time when the 
failure of much of the good governance agenda in delivering strong results is resulting 
in reform fatigue and the perception that perhaps governance is not after all very 
important for poor countries. This would be an unfortunate conclusion given the 
historical evidence that the absence of (growth-enhancing) governance capabilities 
has severely constrained poor countries from solving market failures that have 
constrained their growth and development. Rather, the conclusion should be that 
while the good governance (or market-enhancing governance) goals are in many cases 
desirable long-term goals for all countries, many of these goals are not achievable to 
any significant degree in poor countries. They are certainly not achievable to an extent 
that market efficiency will improve so much that other governance reform goals 
become irrelevant. On the contrary, the governance capabilities that need to be 
prioritized in developing countries are likely to be variants of the growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities required for dealing with critical market failures that we find 
in successful and sustained growth experiences in East Asia, China and elsewhere. 
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